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New submissions for Fri, 23 Feb 18

[1]  arXiv:1802.08061 [pdf, ps, other]
Title: Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from Experimental Economics
Comments: 22 pages, 7 figures; algorithmic collusion; Cournot duopoly model; experimental economics; game theory; collusion algorithm design; iterated prisoner's dilemma; antitrust; mechanism design
Subjects: Econometrics (econ.EM); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Applications (stat.AP); Machine Learning (stat.ML)

Algorithmic collusion is an emerging concept in current artificial intelligence age. Whether algorithmic collusion is a creditable threat remains as an argument. In this paper, we propose an algorithm which can extort its human rival to collude in a Cournot duopoly competing market. In experiments, we show that, the algorithm can successfully extorted its human rival and gets higher profit in long run, meanwhile the human rival will fully collude with the algorithm. As a result, the social welfare declines rapidly and stably. Both in theory and in experiment, our work confirms that, algorithmic collusion can be a creditable threat. In application, we hope, the frameworks, the algorithm design as well as the experiment environment illustrated in this work, can be an incubator or a test bed for researchers and policymakers to handle the emerging algorithmic collusion.

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